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Abstract
In this paper, a new variant of ElGamal signature scheme is pre-
sented and its security analyzed. We also give, for its theoretical inter-
est, a general form of the signature equation.
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1 Introduction
Since the invention of the public key cryptography in the late 1970s [2, 13, 12],
several new subjects related to the data security as identification, authentica-
tion, zero-knowledge proof and secret sharing were explored. But among all
these issues, and perhaps the most important, is how to build secure digital
signature systems. During more than three decades, the topic, probably due to
its fundamental and practical role in electronic funds transfer, was intensively
investigated [10, 15, 14, 4, 1, 11, 9].
There is only one principle on which rest the digital signature algorithms. To
sign a message m, Alice with the help of her private key, must answer a ques-
tion asked by Bob, the verifier. The question is naturally a function of m.
Nobody other than Alice is able to forge her signature and give the right an-
swer, even the asker himself.
In most digital signature schemes, the considered question is a difficult math-
ematical equation depending of m as a parameter. Only Alice, because she
possesses a private key, is able to solve it. In this protocol, we are not necessary
concerned by the transmitted data security. Indeed, Bob and Alice can pub-
lish respectively the equation and the solution in two protected and separated
personal servers.
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In 1985, ElGamal [3], inspired by the Diffie-Hellman ingenious ideas on new
directions in cryptography [2], was one of the firsts to propose a practical signa-
ture scheme. Used properly, this signature system has never been broken. He
built it on a simple equation with two unknown variables. The hardness of this
equation relies on the discrete logarithm problem [7, p.103]. In general, from a
public key cryptosystem, one can derive a signature scheme. Curiously, in his
paper [3], ElGamal did not exploit this possibility and it is still unclear how
he found his signature equation. This fact has encouraged many researchers
to look for equations having properties similar to those of ElGamal. See, for
instance, [14, 4, 5].
Some practical signature protocols as Schnorr method [14] and the digital sig-
nature algorithm DSA [8] are directly derived from ElGamal scheme.
Permanently, ElGamal signature scheme is facing attacks more and more so-
phisticated. If the system is completely broken, alternative protocols, previ-
ously designed, prepared and tested, would be useful. In this work we present
a new variant of the ElGamal signature method and analyze its security. Fur-
thermore, we give, just for its theoretical interest, a general form of our signa-
ture equation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the basic ElGamal
signature algorithm and recall the main known attacks. Our new variant and a
theoretical generalization are presented in section 3. We conclude in section 4.
In the sequel, we will adopt ElGamal paper notations [3]. Z, N are respectively
the sets of integers and non-negative integers. For every positive integer n, we
denote by Zn the finite ring of modular integers and by Z
∗
n the multiplicative
group of its invertible elements. Let a, b, c be three integers. The great com-
mon divisor of a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b). We write a ≡ b [c] if c divides
the difference a− b, and a = b mod c if a is the remainder in the division of b
by c.
We start by describing the original ElGamal signature scheme.
2 ElGamal Original Signature Scheme
We recall in this section the basic ElGamal protocol in three steps, followed
by the most known attacks.
2.1. ElGamal Algorithm
1. Alice begins by choosing three numbers :
- p, a large prime integer.
- α, a primitive root [7, p.69] of the finite multiplicative group Z∗p.
- x, a random element in {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
She computes y = αx mod p. We consider then that : (p, α, y) is Alice public
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key and x her private key.
2. Assume that Alice wants to sign the message m < p. She must solve the
congruence
αm ≡ yr rs [p] (1)
where r and s are two unknown variables.
Alice fixes arbitrary r to be r = αk mod p, where k is chosen randomly and
invertible modulo p− 1. She has exactly ϕ(p− 1) possibilities for k, where ϕ
est the phi-Euler function [7, p.65]. Equation (1) is then equivalent to :
m ≡ x r + k s [p− 1] (2)
As Alice possesses the secret key x, and as the integer k is invertible modulo
p− 1, she computes the second unknown variable s by : s ≡
m− x r
k
[p− 1]
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking that congruence (1) is valid.
Keys generation problem must be taken into account. There exist essentially
probabilistic algorithms for generating prime integers. In a recent previous
work [6], we obtained experimental results on the subject.
Now, we recall the main known attacks.
2.2. Main attacks
The first attack was mentioned by ElGamal himself [3]. It is not recommended
to sign two different messages with the same secret exponent. As the complete
justification of this attack does not figure in the ElGamal paper, we reproduce
here the proof from [16, p. 291] which seems to us, less restrictive than that
in [7, p.455].
Proposition 2.1. If Alice signs more than one message with the same secret
exponent, then her system can be totally broken.
Proof. Let (m1, r, s1) and (m2, r, s2) be the signatures of the two messages m1
and m2 with the same secret exponent k. Due to relation (2), we retrieve Alice
secret key x if we find the value of the parameter k provided that r is invertible
modulo p− 1.
We have m1 ≡ x r + k s1 [p− 1] and m2 ≡ x r + k s2 [p− 1], so :
m1 −m2 ≡ k (s1 − s2) [p− 1] (3)
If we put gcd(s1 − s2, p − 1) = d, there exist two integers S and P such that
s1 − s2 = d S, p− 1 = d P and gcd(S, P ) = 1. Thus relation (3) becomes :
m1−m2 = k (s1−s2)+K (p−1) = k d S+K dP, K ∈ Z. WithM = k S+K P ,
we obtain M ≡ k S [P ]. As S is invertible modulo P , we have
k = M S−1 +K P (4)
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Since k < p− 1 and p− 1 = d P , we deduce that K < d. By equality (4), we
can test every value of K and check if r ≡ αk [p]. We find K if d is not too
large.
In 1996, Bleichenbacher [1] has discovered an important fact : when some
parameters are smooth [16, p.197], it is possible to forge ElGamal signature
without solving the discrete logarithm problem. We present here a slightly
modified version of his result.
Proposition 2.2. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key. Suppose that β < p
is a positive integer for which one can efficiently compute t ∈ N such that
α ≡ βt [p].
If
p− 1
gcd(p− 1, β)
is smooth, then an Alice adversary will be able to forge her
signature for any given message M .
Proof. Let D = gcd(p − 1, β) and β = λD, λ ∈ N∗. We denote by H the
subgroup of Z∗ generated by αD mod p. Since yD ≡ (αx)D ≡ (αD)x [p], we
have yD ∈ H . From a well known result, as the order (p−1)/D of H is smooth,
the discrete logarithm problem is computationally feasible : one can efficiently
find z0 ∈ N such that y
D ≡ (αD)z0 [p].
Let M a message to be signed and m = h(M) mod p where h is a public
hash function. Alice adversary sets r = β. ElGamal signature equation (1)
becomes :
βtm ≡ yβ βs ≡ yλD βs ≡ (αD)z0 λ βs ≡ βλ t z0 D βs [p]
Hence s ≡ t (m − β z0) [p − 1], and then the couple (r, s) is a valid signature
of the message M , which achieves the proof.
Observe that it is not so surprising to choose r = β or r = βi mod p, i ∈ N,
since βt ≡ α [p] implies that β is an other generator of Z∗n.
Next section presents our main contribution.
3 New Variant and Theoretical Generalization
In this section, we suggest a new variant of ElGamal signature scheme based
on an equation with three unknown variables. The method does not need the
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computation of the secret exponent inverse and so avoids the use of the ex-
tended Euclidean algorithm. Technical report [4], although it collected several
signature equations, did not study the case we propose here.
3.1. Our protocol
We suppose first that h is a public secure hash function. We can take h equal
to the secure hash algorithm SHA1 [7, Chap.9] and [16, Chap.5].
1. Alice begins by choosing her public key (p, α, y), where p is a large prime
integer, α is a primitive element of the finite multiplicative group Z∗p and
y = αx mod p. Element x, which is a random integer in {1, 2, 3, . . . , p− 1}, is
Alice private key.
2. Assume that Alice wants to sign the message M < p. She must solve the
congruence
αt ≡ yr rs sm [p] (5)
where r, s and t are three unknown variables and m = h(M) mod p.
Alice fixes arbitrary r to be r = αk mod p, and s to be s = αl mod p, where
k, l are chosen randomly in {1, 2, . . . , p− 1}.
Equation (5) is then equivalent to :
t ≡ r x+ ks+ l m [p− 1]. (6)
As Alice detains the secret key x and knows the values of r, s, k, l,m, she is
able to compute the third unknown variable t.
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking that congruence (5) holds.
Our scheme has the advantage that it does not need the use of the extended
Euclidean algorithm for computing k−1 modulo p− 1. May be this can be an
answer to problems evoked in [9, subsection 1.3].
To illustrate the technique, we give the following small example.
Example 3.1. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key where : p = 509, α = 2 and
y = 482. We emphasize that we are not sure if using a short value of α does
not weaken the system. The private key is x = 281. Suppose that Alice wants
to produce a signature for the message M for which m ≡ h(M) ≡ 432 [508]
with the two random exponents k = 208 and l = 386. She computes r ≡ αk ≡
2208 ≡ 332 [p], s ≡ αl ≡ 2386 ≡ 39 [p] and t ≡ r x + k s + l m ≡ 440 [p − 1].
Bob or anyone can verify the relation αt ≡ yr rs sm [p]. Indeed, we find that
αt ≡ 436 [p] and yr rs sm ≡ 436 [p]. Notice here that k and l are even integers
unlike in ElGamal protocol where the exponent k is always odd since it must
be relatively prime with p− 1.
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3.2. Security analysis
Suppose that Oscar is an Alice adversary. Let us discuss some possible and
realistic attacks.
Attack 1 : Knowing all signature parameters for a particular message M ,
Oscar tries to find Alice secret key x.
Equation (5) is equivalent to αt ≡ αx r rs sm [p], so αrx ≡ αt r−s s−m [p].
Therefore, Oscar is confronted to the hard discrete logarithm problem.
If Oscar prefers to work with relation (6), he needs to know k and l. Their
computation conducts to the discrete logarithm problem.
Attack 2 : Oscar tries to forge Alice signature for a message M , by first,
fixing arbitrary two unknown variables and looking for the third parameter.
(1) Suppose for example that Oscar has fixed r, s, and tries to solve equation
(5) in the variable t. But here again, he will be confronted to the discrete
logarithm problem.
(2) Assume that Oscar has fixed r and t. We have from relation (5): rs sm ≡
αt y−r [p]; and there is no known way to solve this equation.
(3) Assume now that Oscar has fixed s and t. We have from relation (5) :
yr rs ≡ αt s−m [p]; and this equation is similar to the last case, so it is in-
tractable.
Attack 3 : Let us admit that Oscar has collected n valid signatures for
messages Mi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} and n ∈ N. He will obtain a system of n
modular equations :
(S)


t1 ≡ x r1 + k1 s1 + l1m1 [p− 1]
t2 ≡ x r2 + k2 s2 + l2m2 [p− 1]
...
...
...
tn ≡ x rn + kn sn + lnmn [p− 1]
Where ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}, ri ≡ α
ki [p], si ≡ α
li [p] et mi ≡ h(Mi) [p]
Since system (S) contains 2n+1 unknown variables x, ri, si, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n},
Oscar can find several valid solutions. However, as x is Alice secret key, it has
a unique possibility and therefore Oscar will never be sure what value of x is
the correct one. Consequently, this attack is to be rejected.
Next result is similar to that exists in ElGamal scheme.
Proposition 3.2. If no hash function is used, then Oscar can forge exis-
tentially Alice signature.
Proof. Assume that Alice products the parameters (r, s, t) as a signature for
the message M . So αt ≡ yr rs sm [p]. Let k, k′, l, l′ ∈ N be four arbitrary
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integers with gcd(l′, p−1) = 1. If Oscar chooses r ≡ αk yk
′
[p] and s ≡ αl yl
′
[p],
he would obtain :
αt ≡ yr (αk s yk
′ s) (αlm yl
′ m) [p]. (7)
Relation (7) holds if
{
t− k s− l m ≡ 0 [p− 1] (7.1)
t− k′ s− l′m ≡ 0[p− 1] (7.2)
Oscar computes m from equality (7.2) : m ≡
r + k′ s
l′
[p − 1]; and from (7.1)
he has t ≡ k s +
l (r + k′ s)
l′
[p − 1]. Thus (r, st) is a valid signature for the
message m.
Remark 3.3. Alice can sign two messages with the same couple of secret
exponents. Indeed, let (r, s, t1) and (r, s, t2) be the signatures of the two dif-
ferent messages M1 and M2 associated to the secret exponents (k, l). We have{
t1 ≡ x r + k s + l m1 [p− 1]
t2 ≡ x r + k s + l m2 [p− 1]
where m1 ≡ h(M1) [p− 1] et m2 ≡ h(M2) [p− 1].
We can follow the method used in the proof of Proposition 1 and find the value
of l, but it seems that it is not an easy task to retrieve secret parameters k
and x.
3.3. Complexity of our method :
As in [5], let Texp, Tmult, Th, be respectively the time to perform a modular
exponentiation, a modular multiplication and hash function computation of a
message M . We ignore the time required for modular additions, substractions,
comparisons and make the conversion Texp = 240 Tmult.
The signer Alice needs to perform two modular exponentiations, three modular
multiplications and one hash function computation. So the global required
time is : T1 = 2 Texp + 3 Tmult + Th = 483 Tmult + Th.
The verifier Bob needs to perform four modular exponentiations, two modular
multiplications and one hash function computation. So the global required
time is : T2 = 4 Texp + 2 Tmut + Th = 962 Tmult + Th.
The cost of communication, without M , is 6 |p|, since to sign, Alice transmits
(p, α, y) and (r, s, t). |p| denotes the bit-length of the integer p.
Observe that the complexity of our method is not too high relatively to that
of ElGamal scheme or to that in [5].
3.4. Theoretical generalization
Let h be a public secure hash function.
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1. Alice begins by choosing her public key (p, α, y), where p is a large prime
integer, α is a primitive element of the finite multiplicative group Z∗p and
y = αx, x is a random integer in {1, 2, 3, . . . , p− 1}. x is the Alice private key.
2. Assume that Alice wants to sign the message m < p. She must solve the
congruence
αt ≡ yr1 rr2
1
rr3
2
. . . rrnn−1 r
m
n [p] (8)
where r1, r2, . . . , rn, t are n+ 1 unknown variables.
Alice fixes arbitrary r1 to be r1 = α
k1, r2 to be r2 = α
k2,..., and rn to be
rn = α
kn, where k1, k2, . . . , kn are chosen randomly.
Equation (8) is then equivalent to :
t ≡ x r1 + k1 r2 + . . .+ kn−1 rn + knm [p− 1]. (9)
As Alice detains the secret key x and knows the values ri, kj, m, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
she is able to compute the (n+ 1)th unknown variable t.
3. Bob can check that verification condition (8) is valid.
Remark 3.4. Let −→u = (x, k1, k2, . . . , kn) be Alice secret keys vector and
−→v = (r1, r2, . . . , rn, m) the signature parameters vector. If
−→u .−→v denotes the
scalar product, then the last signature parameter t can be obtained from the
modular equation t ≡ −→u .−→v [p − 1], which is an immediate consequence of
relation (9).
4 Conclusion
In this work, we described a new variant of ElGamal signature scheme and
analyzed its security. Our method relies on an ElGamal similar equation with
three unknown variables and it avoids the use of the extended Euclidean algo-
rithm. We also gave a generalization for its theoretical interest.
For the future, one may try to see how to improve our new variant. One idea is
to replace the modular group Z∗p by a subgroup whose order is a prime divisor
of p− 1 or by other remarkable structures as the elliptic curves group.
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